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Abstract
We investigate the computational complexity of the discrete logarithm, the computational
Diffie-Hellman and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problems in some identity black-box groups
Gp,t, where p is a prime number and t is a positive integer. These are defined as quotient
groups of vector space Zt+1p by a hyperplane H given through an identity oracle. While in
general black-box groups with unique encoding these computational problems are classically all
hard and quantumly all easy, we find that in the groups Gp,t the situation is more contrasted.
We prove that while there is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm to solve the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem in Gp,1, the probabilistic query complexity of all the other problems
is Ω(p), and their quantum query complexity is Ω(
√
p). Our results therefore provide a new
example of a group where the computational and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problems have
widely different complexity.
1 Introduction
Black-box groups we introduced by Babai and Szemere´di [5] for studying the structure of finite
matrix groups. In a black-box group, the group elements are encoded by binary strings of certain
length, the multiplication and inverse group operations are given by oracles. Similarly, identity
testing, that is checking whether an element is equal to the identity element, is also done with a
special identity oracle. These oracles are also called black-boxes, giving their names to the groups.
Identity testing is required when several strings may encode the same group element. In this case
we speak about non-unique encoding, in opposition to unique encoding when every group element
is encoded by a unique string. Black-box groups with non-unique encoding are motivated by their
ability to capture factor groups of subgroups of matrix groups by certain normal subgroups which
admit efficient algorithms for membership testing. An important example for such a subgroup is
the solvable radical, that is the largest solvable normal subgroup.
A black-box group problem might only have the oracle inputs if the problem concerns some
global property of the group. In some other cases it might also have standard inputs (or shortly
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inputs), a finite set of group elements represented by their encodings. A black-box group algorithm
is allowed to call the oracles for the group operations and for the identity test and it might also
perform arbitrary bit operations. The query complexity of an algorithm is the number of oracle
calls, while the running time or computational complexity is the number of oracle calls together
with the number of other bit operations, when we are maximizing over both oracle and standard
inputs. In the quantum setting, the oracles are given by unitary operators.
Many classical algorithms have been developped for computations with black-box groups [6,
4, 14], for example the identification of the composition factors, even the non-commutative ones.
When the oracle operations can be simulated by efficient procedures, efficient black-box algorithms
automatically produce efficient algorithms. Permutation groups, finite matrix groups over finite
fields and over algebraic number fields fit in this context. There has been also considerable effort to
design quantum algorithms in black-box groups. In the case of unique encoding efficient algorithms
have been conceived for the decomposition of Abelian groups into a direct sum of cyclic groups of
prime power order [9], order computing and membership testing in solvable groups [22] and solving
the hidden subgroup problem in Abelian groups [17].
The discrete logarithm problem DLOG, and various Diffie-Hellman type problems are funda-
mental tasks in computational number theory. They are equally important in cryptography, since
the security of many cryptographic systems is based on their computational difficulty. Let G be
a cyclic group (denoted additively). Given two group elements g and h, where g is a generator,
DLOG asks to compute an integer d such that h = dg. Given three group elements g, ag and
bg, where g is a generator, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem CDH is to compute (ab)g.
Given three group elements g, ag, bg and cg, where g is a generator, the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem DDH is to decide whether c = ab modulo the order of g.
The problems are enumerated in decreasing order of difficulty: DDH can not be harder than
CDH and CDH is not harder than DLOG. While there are groups where even DLOG is easy (for
example Zm, the additive group of integers modulo m), in general all three problems are thought to
be computationally hard. We are not aware of any group where CDH is easy while DLOG is hard.
In fact, Maurer and Wolf have proven in [16] that under a seemingly reasonable number-theoretic
assumption, the two problems are equivalent in the case of unique-encoding groups. Based on this,
Joux and Nguyen [13] have constructed a cryptographic group where DDH is easy to compute
while CDH is as hard as DLOG. In generic black-box groups we have provable query lower
bounds for these problems, even in the case of unique encoding. Shoup has proven [21] that in
Zp, given as a black-box group with unique encoding, to solve DLOG and CDH require Ω(p
1/2)
group operations. Subsequently, Damg˚ard, Hazay and Zottare [10] have established a lower bound
of the same order for DDH. We remark that the Pohlig-Hellman [18] algorithm reduces DLOG
in arbitrary cyclic groups to DLOG in its prime order subgroups. Furthermore, in prime order
groups (with unique encodings), Shanks’s baby-step giant-step algorithm solve the problem using
O(p1/2) group operation, thus matching the lower bound for black-box groups.
Though, as we said, all three problems are considered computationally intractable on a classical
computer, there is a polynomial time quantum algorithm for DLOG due to Shor [20]. Since
DLOG is an instance of the Abelian hidden subgroup problem, Mosca’s result [17] implies that by
a quantum computer it can also be solved efficiently in black-box groups with unique encoding.
We are concerned here with identity black-box group, a special class of black-box groups where
only the identity test is given by an oracle. These groups are quotient groups of some explicitly
given ambient group. An identity black box group G is specified by an ambient group G′ and an
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identity oracle Id which tests membership in some (unknown) normal subgroup H of G′. In G
the group operations are explicitly defined by the group operations in G′, and therefore it is the
quotient group G′/H.
Let p be a prime number. More specifically we will study the problems DLOG, CDH and
DDH in identity black-box groups whose ambient group is Zt+1p , for some positive integer t, and
where the normal subgroup H, specified by the identity oracle, is isomorphic to Ztp. We denote such
an identity black box group by Gp,t. We fully characterize the complexity of the three problems
in these groups. Our results are mainly query lower bounds: the probabilistic query complexity of
all these problems, except DDH in level 1 groups, is Ω(p), and their quantum query complexity
is Ω(
√
p). These lower bounds are obviously tight since DLOG(Gp,t) can be solved, for all t ≥ 1,
by exhaustive search and by Grover’s algorithm in respective query complexity p and O(
√
p). We
have also one, maybe surprising, algorithmic result: the computational complexity of DDH(Gp,1)
is polynomial. Our results can be summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem (Lower bounds)
1. For all t ≥ 1, the randomized query complexity of DLOG(Gp,t) and CDH(Gp,1) is Ω(p).
2. For all t ≥ 1, the quantum query complexity of DLOG(Gp,t) and CDH(Gp,1) is Ω(√p).
3. For all t ≥ 2, the randomized query complexity of DDH(Gp,t) is Ω(p).
4. For all t ≥ 2, the quantum query complexity of DDH(Gp,t) is Ω(√p).
Theorem (Upper bound) DDH(Gp,1) can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time in log p.
2 Preliminaries
Formally, a black-box group G is a 4-tuple G = (C,Mult, Inv, Id) where C is the set of admissible
codewords, Mult : C × C 7→ C is a binary operation, Inv : C → C is a unary operation and
Id : C → {0, 1} is a unary Boolean function. The operations Mult, Inv and the function Id are
given by oracles. We require that there exists a finite group G˜ and a surjective map φ : C → G˜ for
which, for every x, y ∈ C, we have φ(Mult(x, y)) = φ(x)φ(y), φ(Inv(x)) = φ(x)−1, and φ(x) = 1
G˜
if
and only if Id(x) = 1. We say that x is the identity element in G or that x = 1 if Id(x) = 1. With
the identity oracle we can test equality since x = y in G exactly when Id(Mult(x, Inv(y))) = 1. We
say that a black-box group has unique encoding if φ is a bijection. For abelian groups we also use
the additive notation in which case the binary operation of G is denoted by Add and its identity
element is denoted by 0.
We are concerned here with a special class of black-box groups which are quotient groups of
some explicitly given group. An identity black-box group is a couple G = (G′, Id) where G′ is group
and the identity oracle Id : G′ → {0, 1} is the characteristic function of some (unknown) normal
subgroup H of G′. We call G′ the ambient group of G. In G the group operations Mult and Inv
are defined by the group operations in the ambient group G′ modulo H. As a consequence, G is
the quotient group G′/H.
Let p be a prime number and let t ≥ 1 be a positive integer. We denote by Zp the additive
group of integers modulo p, by Fp the finite field of size p, and by Z
t
p the t-dimensional vector space
over Fp. For h, k ∈ Ztp, we denote their scalar product modulo p by h · k.
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We will work with identity black-box groups whose ambient group is Zt+1p , and the subgroup
H is isomorphic to Ztp, that is a hyperplane of Z
t+1
p . We will specify the identity oracle by a non-
zero normal vector n ∈ Zt+1p of H. By permuting coordinates and multiplying by some non-zero
constant, we can suppose without loss of generality that it is of the form n = (1, n1, . . . , nt). We
call such a vector t-suitable. We define the function Idn : Z
t+1
p → {0, 1} by Idn(h) = 1 if h · n = 0.
Clearly Idn is the characteristic function of the hyperplane Hn = {h ∈ Zt+1p : h · n = 0}. We define
the identity black-box group Gp,t = (Z
t+1
p , Id), where the identity oracle Id satisfies Id = Idn, for
some (unknown) t-suitable vector n. We call t the level of the group Gp,t. We emphasize again that
the group operations of Gp,t are performed as group operations in Z
t+1
p . Therefore, for h, k ∈ Zt+1p ,
the equality h = k in Gp,t means equality in Z
t+1
p modulo Hn, where Hn is identified by Idn. To
be short, we will refer to Gp,t as the hidden cyclic group of level t.
Proposition 2.1. The groups Gp,t, and Zp are isomorphic and the map φ : Gp,t → Zp defined by
φ(h) = h · n ∈ Zp is a group isomorphism.
Proof. The maps from Zt+1p to Gp,t (respectively to Zp) mapping h ∈ Zt+1p to its class in the quotient
Gp,t (respectively to h · n) are group homomorphisms with the same kernel Hn.
We recall now the basic notions of query complexity for the specific case of boolean oracle
functions. Let m be a positive integer. An oracle function is a function A : S → {0, 1}M , where
S ⊆ {0, 1}m and M ≥ 1 is a positive integer. If M = 1, then we call the oracle function boolean.
The input f ∈ S is given by an oracle, that is f(x) can be accessed by the query x. The output on
f is A(f). Each query adds one to the complexity of an algorithm, but all other computations are
free. The state of the computation is represented by three registers, the query register 1 ≤ x ≤ m,
the answer register a ∈ {0, 1}, and the work register z. The computation takes place in the vector
space spanned by all basis states |x〉|a〉|z〉. In the quantum query model introduced by Beals et
al. [7] the state of the computation is a complex combination of all basis states which has unit
length in the norm l2. In the randomized query model it is a non-negative real combination of unit
length in the norm l1, and in the deterministic model it is always one of the basis states.
The query operation Of maps the basis state |x〉|a〉|z〉 into the state |x〉|(a + f(x)) mod 2〉|z〉.
Non-query operations do not depend on f . A k-query algorithm is a sequence of (k+1) operations
(U0, U1, . . . , Uk) where Ui is unitary in the quantum, and stochastic in the randomized model.
Initially the state of the computation is set to some fixed value |0〉|0〉|0〉, and then the sequence
of operations U0, Of , U1, Of , . . ., Uk−1, Of , Uk is applied. A quantum or randomized algorithm
computes A on input f if the observation of the last M bits of the work register yields A(f) with
probability at least 2/3. Then Q(A) (respectively R(A)) is the smallest k for which there exists
a k-query quantum (respectively randomized) algorithm which computes A on every input f . We
have R(A) ≤ Q(A) ≤ m.
We define now our problems we are concerened with, the discrete logarithm problem DLOG,
the computational Diffie-Hellman problem CDH and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem DDH
in hidden cyclic groups Gp,t. We say that a quadruple (g, h, k, ℓ) ∈ G4p,t where g is a generator
of Gp,t is a DH-quadruple if h = ag, k = bg and ℓ = cg for some integers a, b, c such that c = ab
modulo p.
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DLOG(Gp,t)
Oracle input: Idn for some t-suitable vector n.
Input: A couple (g, h) ∈ G2p,t such that g is a generator of Gp,t.
Output: A non-negative integer d such that dg = h.
CDH(Gp,t)
Oracle input: Idn for some t-suitable vector n.
Input: A triple (g, h, k) ∈ G3p,t such that g is a generator of Gp,t.
Output: ℓ ∈ Gp,t such that (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple.
DDH(Gp,t)
Oracle input: Idn for some t-suitable vector n.
Input: A quadruple (g, h, k, ℓ) ∈ G4p,t such that g is a generator of Gp,t.
Question: Is (g, h, k, ℓ) a DH-quadruple?
An algorithm for these problems has access to the input and oracle access to the oracle input,
and every query is counted as one computational step. We say that it solves the problem efficiently
if it works in time polynomial in log p and t. For any fixed input, the problems become oracle
functions, where we consider only those identity oracles for which the input is legitimate. By their
query complexity we mean, both in the quantum and in the randomized model, the maximum, over
all inputs, of the respective query complexity of these oracle function.
The problems are enumerated in decreasing order of difficulty. The existence of an efficient algo-
rithm for DLOG(Gp,t) implies the existence of an efficient algorithm for CDH(Gp,t), which in turn
gives rise to an efficient algorithm for DDH(Gp,t). For query complexity we have Q(DDH(Gp,t)) ≤
Q(CDH(Gp,t)) ≤ Q(DLOG(Gp,t)), and the same inequalities hold for the randomized model. The
problems are getting harder as the level of the hidden cyclic group increases, as the almost trivial
reductions in the next Proposition show. To ease notation, for h = (h0, . . . , ht) in Z
t+1
p , we denote
by h′ the element (h0, . . . , ht, 0) ∈ Zt+2p .
Proposition 2.2. For every t ≥ 1, DLOG(Gp,t) and DDH(Gp,t) are polynomial time many-
one reducible to respectively DLOG(Gp,t+1) and DDH(Gp,t+1); and CDH(Gp,t) is computable in
polynomial time with a single query to CDH(Gp,t+1).
Proof. First observe that the identity oracle Idn′ in Gp,t+1 can be simulated by the identity oracle
Idn of Gp,t. Indeed, for an arbitrary element h
∗ in Gp,t+1, where h
∗ = (h0, h1, . . . , ht, ht+1), set
h = (h0, h1, . . . , ht). Then h
∗ · n′ = h · n. Let g be a generator of Gp,t with identity oracle Idn, that
is g · n 6= 0. Then g′ = (g, 0) is a generator of Gp,t+1 with identity oracle Idn′ , since g′ · n′ = g · n,
and therefore g′ · n′ 6= 0.
For arbitrary h, k, ℓ ∈ Gp,t, and for every integer d, we have dg = h if and only if dg′ = h′.
Similarly, (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if (g′, h′, k′, ℓ′) is a DH-quadruple. This gives
the many-one reductions for DLOG and DDH. In the CDH reduction, on an instance (g, h, k), we
call CDH(Gp,t+1) on instance (g
′, h′, k′). Suppose that it gives the answer ℓ∗ = (ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓt, ℓt+1).
We set ℓ = (ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓt), and observe that (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple because (g
′, h′, k′, ℓ∗) is a
DH-quadruple and ℓ∗ · n′ = ℓ · n.
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3 The complexity in groups of level 1
In most parts of this section we restrict ourselves to the case t = 1. To simplify notation, we set
n = (1, s) and we denote the identity oracle Idn by Ids and the line Hn by Hs. Also, we refer to s
as the secret. As it turns out, solving DLOG(Gp,1) or CDH(Gp,1) is essentially as hard as finding
the secret, therefore we define formally this problem as
SECRET(Gp,1)
Oracle input: Ids for some s ∈ Zp.
Output: s.
What is the complexity of finding s, that is how many calls to the identity oracle are needed for
that task? To answer this question, we consider US, the well studied unstructured search problem.
For this, let C be an arbitrary set, and let s ∈ C be an arbitrary distinguished element. Then the
Grover oracle ∆s : C → {0, 1} is the boolean function such that ∆s(x) = 1 if and only if x = s.
The unstructured search problem over C is defined as
US(C)
Oracle input: ∆s for some s ∈ C.
Output: s.
Suppose that the size of C is N . It is easily seen that probabilistic query complexity of US(C)
is linear in N . The quantum query complexity of the problem is also well studied. Grover [11] has
determined that it can be solved with O(
√
N) queries, while Bennett at al. [8] have shown that
Ω(
√
N) queries are also necessary.
Fact 3.1. For |C| = N , the randomized query complexity of US(C) is Θ(N) and its quantum query
complexity is Θ(
√
N).
The relationship between US and the problem SECRET is given by the fact that the identity
oracle Ids and the Grover oracle ∆s can simulate each other with a single query.
Proposition 3.2. The identity oracle Ids of Gp,s and the Grover oracle ∆s, defined over Zp, can
simulate each other with at most one query.
Proof. The simulation of the Grover oracle by the identity oracle is simple: for x ∈ Zp just query
Ids on (x,−1).
For the reverse direction, let h = (h0, h1) be an input to the identity oracle. Then h is the
identity element, that is Ids(h) = 1 if and only if −h0 = sh1. When h1 is invertible in Zp we can
check by the Grover oracle if −h0h−11 = s. For h1 = 0 the only possible value to put h into Hs is
0. Therefore we have
Id(h) =

1 if h = (0, 0)
0 if h1 = 0 and h0 6= 0
∆s(−h0h−11 ) otherwise.
Corollary 3.3. The randomized query complexity of SECRET(Gp,1) is Θ(p) and its quantum
query complexity is Θ(
√
p).
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We will now consider the reductions of SECRET(Gp,1) to DLOG(Gp,1) and CDH(Gp,1). The
case of DLOG(Gp,1) in fact follows from the case of CDH(Gp,1), but it is so simple that it is worth
to describe it explicitely.
Lemma 3.4. The secret s in Gp,1 can be found with a single oracle call to DLOG(Gp,1)
Proof. First observe that (1, 0) is a generator of Gp,1, for every s. The algorithm calls DLOG(Gp,1)
on input (g, h) = ((1, 0), (0, 1)). Since φ(g) = 1 and φ(h) = s, the oracle’s answer is the secret s
itself.
We remark that with overwhelming probability we could have given also a random couple
(g, h) ∈ G2p,1 to the oracle, where g is a generator. Indeed, let’s suppose that d is the discrete
logarithm. Then h− dg ∈ Hs, and therefore s = −(h0− dg0)(h1− dg1)−1, where the operations are
done in Zp, under the condition that h1 − dg1 6= 0, which happens with probability (p − 1)/p.
The reduction of SECRET(Gp,1) to CDH(Gp,1) requires more work. The main idea of the
reduction is to extend Zp to a field and use the multiplication for the characterization of DH-
quadruples. Indeed, since Zp is the additive group of the field Fp, we can use the isomorphism φ of
Proposition 2.1 between Gp,t and Zp to define appropriate multiplication and multiplicative inverse
operations. This extends Gp,t to a field isomorphic to Fp which we denote by Fp,t. This process is
completely standard but we describe it for completeness. The definitions of these two operations
are:
hk = φ−1(φ(h)φ(k)),
h−1 = φ−1(φ(h)−1).
With these operations the map φ becomes a field isomorphism between Fp,t and Fp.
Proposition 3.5. The map φ of Proposition 2.1 is an isomorphism between Fp,t and Fp.
Proof. By definition φ(hk) = φ(h)φ(k) and φ(h−1) = φ(h)−1.
The field structure of Fp,t yields a very useful characterization of DH-quadruples.
Proposition 3.6. Let g be a generator of Gp,t. In Fp,t the quadruple (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple
if and only if
gℓ− hk = 0.
Proof. Let h = ag, k = bg and ℓ = cg for some integers a, b, c. Using the field structure of Fp,t, it
is true that gℓ− hk = 0 if and only if (c − ab)g2 = 0. Since Fp,t is isomorphic to Fp, an element g
is a generator of the additive group Zp exactly when g 6= 0, and therefore when g2 is a generator.
Therefore (c− ab)g2 = 0 if an only if c = ab.
We define the application χ : Zt+1p → Fp[x1, . . . , xt], from Zt+1p to the ring of t-variate polynomi-
als over Fp, where the image χ(h) of h = (h0, h1, . . . , ht) ∈ Zt+1p is the polynomial ph(x1, . . . , xt) =
h0 +
∑t
i=1 hixi. Observe that ph(n1, . . . nt) = h · n, therefore the isomorphism φ between Gp,t with
identity oracle Idn and Zp can be also expressed as φ(h) = ph(n1, . . . nt).
Proposition 3.7. Let g be a generator of Gp,1 and let h, k, ℓ be arbitrary elements. Then (g, h, k, ℓ)
is a DH-quadruple if and only if s is a root of the polynomial pg(x)pℓ(x)− ph(x)pk(x).
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Proof. By Proposition 3.6 we know that (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if gℓ − hk =
0, that is when pgℓ−hk(s) = 0. Now Proposition 3.5 implies that this happens exactly when
pg(s)pℓ(s)− ph(s)pk(s) = 0.
Lemma 3.8. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which, given oracle access to
CDH(Gp,1), solves SECRET(Gp,1). The algorithm asks a single query to CDH(Gp,1). If we are
also given a quadratic non-residue in Zp, the algorithm can be made deterministic.
Proof. The algorithm sets g = (1, 0), h = (0, 1), k = (1, 1) and presents it to the oracle. Let the
oracle’s answer be ℓ = (ℓ0, ℓ1). Since (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple, by Proposition 3.7 we have that
s is the root of the second degree equation
x2 + (1− ℓ1)x+ ℓ0 = 0.
Assuming that a quadratic non-residue in Zp is available then the (not necessarily distinct) roots
x1, x2 can be computed in deterministic polynomial time using the Shanks-Tonelli algorithm [19].
Without this assumption, a quadratic non-residue can always be computed in probabilistic poly-
nomial time. Finally, we make at most two calls to Ids on (x1,−1) and on (x2,−1). The positive
answer tells us which one of the roots is the secret s.
Similarly to the DLOG case, we could have presented with overwhelming probability also a
random triple (g, h, k) ∈ G3p,s to CDH(Gp,1), where g is a generator. Indeed, if the oracle answer
is ℓ = (ℓ0, ℓ1) then s is a root of the at most second degree equation
(g0 + g1x)(ℓ0 + ℓ1x) = (h0 + h1x)(k0 + k1x).
If the equation is of degree 2 then we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3.8. This happens
exactly when h1k1 6= g1ℓ1. But for every possible fixed value a for g1ℓ1, the probability, over random
h1 and k1, that h1k1 = a is at most 2/p, the worst case being a = 0. Therefore a random triple
(g, h, k) would be suitable for the proof with probability at least (p− 2)/p.
Theorem 3.9. The following lower bounds hold for the query complexity of DLOG and CDH:
(1) The classical query complexity of both DLOG(Gp,s) and CDH(Gp,s) is Ω(p).
(2) The quantum query complexity of both DLOG(Gp,s) and CDH(Gp,s) is Ω(
√
p).
Proof. Let us suppose that with m queries to the identity oracle Ids, one can solve DLOG(Gp,1)
or CDH(Gp,1). Respectively Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.8 imply that SECRET(Gp,1) can be solved
with m queries. The result then follows from the lower bounds of Corollary 3.3.
Theorem 3.10. The DDH(Gp,1) problem can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time. If we are
given a quadratic non-residue in Zp the algorithm can be made deterministic.
Proof. Let (g, h, k, ℓ) be an input to DDH(Gp,1) where g is a generator of Gp,1. By Proposition 3.7
it is a DH-quadruple if and only if s is a root of the polynomial pg(x)pℓ(x)−ph(x)pk(x), and that is
what the algorithm checks. When the polynomial is constant, then the answer is yes if the constant
is zero, and otherwise it is no. When the polynomial is non constant, the algorithm essentially
proceeds as the one in Lemma 3.8. It solves the at most second degree equation and then checks
with the identity oracle if one root is equal to s.
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4 The complexity of DDH in groups of level 2
There are several powerful means to prove quantum query lower bounds, most notably the adversary
and the polynomial method [7]. The quantum adversary method initiated by Ambainis [2] has been
extended in several ways. The most powerful of those, the method using negative weights [12],
turned out to be an exact characterization of the quantum query complexity [15]. We use here a
special case of the positive weighted adversary method that also gives probabilistic lower bounds.
Fact 4.1. [1, 3, 23] Let A : S → {0, 1} be a boolean oracle function, where S ⊆ {0, 1}m. For any
S × S matrix M , set
σ(M,f) =
∑
g∈S
M [f, g].
Let Γ be an arbitrary S × S nonnegative symmetric matrix that satisfies Γ[f, g] = 0 whenever
A(f) = A(g). For 1 ≤ x ≤ m, let Γx be the matrix
Γx[f, g] =
{
0 if f(x) = g(x),
Γ[f, g] otherwise.
Then
Q(A) = Ω
(
min
Γ[f,g] 6=0,f(x)6=g(x)
√
σ(Γ, f)σ(Γ, g)
σ(Γx, f)σ(Γx, g)
)
,
R(A) = Ω
(
min
Γ[f,g] 6=0,f(x)6=g(x)
max
{
σ(Γ, f)
σ(Γx, f)
,
σ(Γ, g)
σ(Γx, g)
})
.
Theorem 4.2. The following lower bounds hold for the query complexity of DDH in level 2 hidden
cyclic groups:
Q(DDH(Gp,2)) = Ω(
√
p) and R(DDH(Gp,2)) = Ω(p).
Proof. Let i = ((1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)). Observe that the element (1, 0, 0) is a generator
of Gp,2, for any 2-suitable vector n = (1, n1, n2). By Proposition 3.6, we know that i is a DH-
quadruple if and only if n1 + n2 = n1n2. We say that n is positive if this equality holds, otherwise
we say that it is negative. Let m = p3 and let S = {Idn : n ∈ Z2p}. We will apply Fact 4.1
to the boolean oracle function DDH defined in Gp,2 on input i with the oracle input being the
identity oracle Idn : Z
3
p → {0, 1}. For simplicity we will refer to this boolean oracle function just
by DDH(n). We define the symmetric p2 × p2 boolean adversary matrix Γ as follows:
Γ[n, n′] =
{
1 if DDH(n) 6= DDH(n′),
0 otherwise,
where again Γ[n, n′] is a shorthand notation for Γ[Idn, Idn′ ].
We first determine σ(Γ, n). If n1 = 1 then there is no n2 such that n1 + n2 = n1n2. Otherwise,
for every fixed n1 6= 1, there is a unique n2 that makes this equality hold, in particular n2 =
n1(n1−1)−1. Therefore the number of positive n is p−1 and the number of negative n is p2−p+1.
Thus we have the following values for σ(Γ, n):
σ(Γ, n) =
{
p2 − p+ 1 if n is positive,
p− 1 otherwise.
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Let us recall, that by definition, for every h ∈ Gp,2,
Γh[n, n
′] =
{
1 if DDH(n) 6= DDH(n′) and Idn(h) 6= Idn′(h),
0 otherwise.
(1)
We fix now n and n′ such that DDH(n) 6= DDH(n′), we will suppose without loss of generality
that n is positive and n′ is negative. We also fix h = (h0, h1, h2) in Z
3
p such that Idn(h) 6= Idn′(h).
This implies that (h1, h2) 6= (0, 0). We want to lower bound σ(Γ, n)/σ(Γh, n) and σ(Γ, n′)/σ(Γh, n′).
Obviously both fractions are at least 1. We distinguish two cases according to whether Idn(h) = 0
or Idn′(h) = 0.
Case 1: Idn′(h) = 0. Then
σ(Γh, n
′) =
∣∣∣∣{(m1,m2) ∈ Z2p : m1 +m2 = m1m2 andh0 + h1m1 + h2m2 = 0
}∣∣∣∣ .
We claim that the cardinality at the right hand side is at most 2. We know already that m1 6= 1
and m2 = m1(m1 − 1)−1. Therefore m1 satisfies the second degree equation
h1x
2 + (h0 − h1 + h2 − 1)x+ (1− h0) = 0.
The number of roots of this equation is at most 2, unless the polynomial is 0. But this can not be
the case, because then h1 = h2 = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, taking into account (1), we have
σ(Γ, n′)
σ(Γh, n′)
= Ω
(p
1
)
= Ω(p). (2)
Case 2: Idn(h) = 0. Then
σ(Γh, n) = |{(m1,m2) ∈ Z2p : h0 + h1m1 + h2m2 = 0}|.
Since (h1, h2) 6= (0, 0), the number of roots of this linear equation with two variables is p. Therefore,
again taking into account (1), we have
σ(Γ, n)
σ(Γh, n)
= Ω
(
p2
p
)
= Ω(p). (3)
The statements of the theorem immediately follow from equations (2) and (3).
Similarly to the remarks after Lemmas 3.4 and 3.8, we could have used in the proof instead
of i a random input (g, h, k, ℓ), with high probability. Indeed, let us suppose that we fix any
u = (u0, u1, u2) in Z
3
p, with (u1, u2) 6= (0, 0), to evaluate the properties of the matrix Γu. If we can
show that the number of solutions of the system of equations
(g0 + g1x+ g2y)(ℓ0 + ℓ1x+ ℓ2y)
− (h0 + h1x+ h2y)(k0 + k1x+ k2y) = 0
u0 + u1x+ u2y = 0
is at most 2, then the same proof works. Without loss of generality we can suppose that u2 6= 0.
We express y from the second equation as function of x and substitute it in the first equation.
We claim that the second degree polynomial we get, in particular its constant member, is non-
zero with probability at least (p − 2)/p. The value of the constant member besides u depends on
g0, g2, ℓ0, ℓ2, h0, h2, k0, k2. We fix arbitrarily all these random variables except g0 and ℓ0. Then, for
some constants a, b, c ∈ Zp, we need to evaluate the probability of the event (g0 + a)(ℓ0 + b) 6= c,
which is at least (p − 2)/p.
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